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FERMAT’S DILEMMA: WHY DID HE KEEP MUM ON
INFINITESIMALS? AND THE EUROPEAN
THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
JACQUES BAIR, MIKHAIL G. KATZ, AND DAVID SHERRY
Abstract. The first half of the 17th century was a time of in-
tellectual ferment when wars of natural philosophy were echoes of
religious wars, as we illustrate by a case study of an apparently
innocuous mathematical technique called adequality pioneered by
the honorable judge Pierre de Fermat, its relation to indivisibles, as
well as to other hocus-pocus. Andre´ Weil noted that simple appli-
cations of adequality involving polynomials can be treated purely
algebraically but more general problems like the cycloid curve can-
not be so treated and involve additional tools–leading the mathe-
matician Fermat potentially into troubled waters. Breger attacks
Tannery for tampering with Fermat’s manuscript but it is Breger
who tampers with Fermat’s procedure by moving all terms to the
left-hand side so as to accord better with Breger’s own interpreta-
tion emphasizing the double root idea. We provide modern proxies
for Fermat’s procedures in terms of relations of infinite proximity
as well as the standard part function.
Keywords: adequality; atomism; cycloid; hylomorphism; indi-
visibles; infinitesimal; jesuat; jesuit; Edict of Nantes; Council of
Trent 13.2
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Father Berteta sayth your
Bookes are in great esteeme,
but not to be procured in
Italy. (Collins to Gregory)
aSee further in note 34.
1. Introduction
In his review of Pietro Redondi’s book on Galileo, Egidio Festa
writes: “Avec la sentence du Tribunal du Saint-Office, la fracture–
qui allait se re´ve´ler irre´versible–entre ve´rite´ de science et ve´rite´ de
foi apparut au grand jour”1 [Festa 1991, p. 94]. Whatever the mer-
its of Festa’s generalisation concerning a conflict opposing science and
catholicism (surely the pagan Aristotelian hylomorphism had to give
way to make room for the emerging atomist science), many modern
studies have focused on such tensions in the context of Galileo and
other scientists (including the jesuit condemnation of indivisibles in
the works of Galileo, Cavalieri, and others). The scientific commu-
nity in France closely followed the 1633 trial; Pierre Gassendi’s role is
analyzed in [Festa 1991]; on Carcavy and Mersenne see Section 4.12.
Mathematicians are sometimes thought to have been affected to a
lesser extent, though well-known examples include Cavalieri and degli
Angeli. In this text we examine evidence that doctrinal factors may
have affected the presentation of the work of a mathematician not usu-
ally thought of as involved in the Galilean controversy: the honorable
judge Pierre de Fermat.
Fermat’s jesuit friend Antoine de Lalouve`re at Toulouse was a “de-
clared enemy” of indivisibles [Descotes 2015, p. 267]. Had Lalouve`re
expressed similar sentiments about them to Fermat as he did in his
mathematical works, it would have provided little encouragement for
Fermat to be overly explicit concerning the foundation of his method
of adequality.
Fermat’s professional activities at the Parliament of Toulouse in-
cluded occasional stints at the Chambre de l’E´dit at a nearby town of
Castres. The relevance of the Chambre specifically is the fact that it
was the organ of the Parliament that dealt with interdenominational
quarrels (mainly of a pecuniary type), with judges split evenly between
1“Following the verdict of the Tribunal of the Holy Office, the split–which would
prove to be irreversible–between the truth of science and the truth of faith appeared
in broad daylight.”
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catholics and protestants. A key disagreement between catholics and
protestants concerned the interpretation of the eucharist and its rela-
tion to atomism and kindred scientific doctrines like indivisibles and
infinitesimals.
Due to the sensitive nature of his engagement at Castres, Fermat may
have found it risky to speak freely of the nature of quantities involved
in his technique of adequality. For his part, jesuit Tacquet claimed
that one must destroy the theory of indivisibles (if Euclidean geometry
is to be saved). If so, legitimate questions could arise concerning its
practitioners’ soundness of judgment and their fitness to judge cases
that come before all-powerful Parliaments.
1.1. A re-evaluation. A re-evaluation of Fermat’s technique of ad-
equality and its place in the history of mathematics involves at least
three components, which we describe respectively as the weak, stan-
dard, and strong theses.
(1) (weak thesis) the fact itself that Fermat refrained from elabo-
rating in detail on the foundations of his technique, and specif-
ically refrained from speculating on the nature of his E used in
the technique, does not constitute evidence toward a hypothesis
that the technique was a purely algebraic one, due to profes-
sional and religious constraints Fermat was operating under,
that would have made any such speculations reckless as far as
his professional career was concerned.
(2) (standard thesis) We challenge the view adopted by some schol-
ars working in a default Weierstrassian interpretive scheme, that
Fermat used a purely algebraic technique unrelated to any no-
tion of approximation or to infinitesimals. We argue that in-
ternal evidence in Fermat’s work on the cycloid, on integration,
and elsewhere points to a contrary conclusion (see Weil’s thesis
in Section 1.4). While Fermat may speak of his E cautiously as
being an arbitrary quantity, in his actual mathematical prac-
tice he exploits it as an arbitrarily small quantity that can be
discarded in certain calculations.
(3) (strong thesis) We argue that the procedures of Fermat’s work
on maxima and minima as well as tangents, centers of gravity,
and refraction find better proxies in the procedures of Robin-
son’s infinitesimal-enriched framework [Robinson 1966] than in
traditional Weierstrassian frameworks stripped of infinitesimals,
just like the procedures of Gregory, Leibniz, Euler, Cauchy, and
others.
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The present article deals mainly with arguing thesis (1). Evidence to-
ward thesis (2) appears in Sections 1.3 and following. Evidence toward
thesis (3) appears in Section 1.9.2 The thesis that Fermat’s procedures
are more akin to modern infinitesimal theories than to classical Weier-
strassian analysis is developed in [Cifoletti 1990] in the context of the
Lawvere–Kock–Reyes framework; see [Kock 2006].
1.2. Procedures versus ontology. Cifoletti seeks to justify “[l]e fait
de juxtaposer deux fragments de the´ories mathe´matiques se´pare´s par
plus de trois cent cinquante ans” [Cifoletti 1990, p. 4]. We would like
to add the following two points to her arguments.
(A) Traditionally trained historians of mathematics apply conceptual
frameworks deriving from modern Weierstrassian foundations, sepa-
rated from Fermat by 250 years, in order to interpret Fermat; thus, the
interpretation in [Barner 2011, p. 17] is explicitly stated to be based
on an implicit function theorem of Ulisse Dini (1845–1918).
(B) The procedure versus ontology dichotomy enables us to seek
proxies for Fermat’s techniques while acknowledging the difference be-
tween ontological foundations of pre-Weierstrassian mathematics and
modern mathematics, whether set-theoretic (as in the case of Weier-
strass and Robinson) or category-theoretic (as in the case of Lawvere).3
On modern proxies see further in Section 1.7.
1.3. Adequality and the cycloid curve. Fermat treated numerous
problems concerning maxima and minima as well as tangents to curves
using a procedure (more precisely, a cluster of procedures) called ade-
quality. Fermat’s work became known mainly through private letters
to correspondents like Carcavy and Mersenne, and was eventually pop-
ularized through inclusion in a book by Pierre He´rigone [Cifoletti 1990,
p. 2].
A typical application involves finding the maximum of an expression
involving x (Fermat used “A”) that we will denote in modern notation
by p(x). Fermat compared p(x) and p(x + E) and after doing alge-
bra to eliminate common terms, he would form a relation (adequality)
among terms divisible by E. He would then cancel out a factor of E
2Cf. [Katz et al. 2013], [Bascelli et al. 2014, Section 3], [B laszczyk et al. 2017,
Section 4].
3These two themes were explored more fully in recent articles in Erkenntnis
[Katz–Sherry 2013], HOPOS [Bascelli et al. 2016], Journal for General Philosophy
of Science [Bair et al. 2017], and elsewhere.
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and then discard any remaining terms in E to obtain the answer4 (a
more detailed example appears in Section 1.9). Since the relation be-
tween p(x) and p(x+E) is not one of true equality, Fermat referred to
it as adequality.
The term adequality originates with Diophantus’ παρισo´της (mean-
ing approximate equality) and πα´ρισoς rendered as adaequo in Bachet’s
translation of Diophantus’ Arithmetic, with which Fermat was inti-
mately familiar. In the text sent to Descartes in the late 1630s Fermat
explicitly names Diophantus as the source of the term: “Adaequentur,
ut loquitur Diophantus”5 [Fermat 1891, p. 133].
For a transcendental curve like the cycloid (see e.g., [Cifoletti 1990,
p. 70]), Fermat solved the problem of finding the tangent line at an
arbitrary point of the curve as follows (see [Fermat 1896, p. 144]). Start
with the defining equation of the cycloid (Fermat refers to such an
equation as la proprie´te´ spe´cifique de la courbe). Consider the tangent
line (to be determined) at a point R of the curve. Choose a nearby
point N on the tangent line. Denote by D and E respectively the
projections of R and N onto a suitable axis. Denote by E the distance
between the points D and E. Substitute the point N into the defining
equation of the cycloid as if it satisfied the latter (hence not equality
but adequality), and proceed with the steps involving cancellations of
the quantity E; see [Katz et al. 2013, Section 5] for details.6
Since the cycloid is a transcendental curve, it would be difficult to
interpret Fermat’s solution as a purely algebraic procedure involving a
formal symbol E, as already noted by Andre´ Weil:
At first Fermat applies the method only to polynomials,
in which case it is of course purely algebraic; later he
extends it to increasingly general problems, including
the cycloid [Weil 1973, p. 1146].
1.4. Weil’s thesis. We will elaborate Weil’s remark cited above as the
following principle:
4To a modern reader familiar with the calculus the procedure is reminiscent of
quotients of increments occurring in the definition of the derivative but the period
under discussion precedes the calculus of Newton and Leibniz.
5“[Let there be] adequated, to speak like Diophantus” (here we use adequate as
a verb–rather than as an adjective–in a neologism aiming to convey the meaning of
the Latin). See further in Section 1.11.
6Herbert Breger attempts to account for Fermat’s treatment of the cycloid with-
out mentioning any notion of smallness but ends up falling back on the condition
“if the point E is not too far away of the point D, then. . . ” [Breger 1994, p. 206].
Breger’s biased criticism of Paul Tannery’s Fermat scholarship is dealt with in Sec-
tion 2.3. Breger’s flawed rendering of Fermat’s method is dealt with in Section 2.6.
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Weil’s thesis : simple applications of Fermat’s method
that involve polynomials can be treated purely alge-
braically, but more general problems (like the cycloid)
cannot be so treated and involve tools that of a more
geometric or analytic flavor.7
Approximate equality similarly plays a role in Andersen’s interpreta-
tion of Fermat’s application of adequality to derive Snell’s law of re-
fraction. The procedure involves discarding second-order terms in E
twice [Andersen 1983, p. 55]. Such a procedure is only meaningful for
small E when higher-order terms are negligible compared to E itself.
Thus Fermat’s treatment of the cycloid and Snell’s law furnishes textual
evidence that his use of E relies on it being small.8
Mahoney assumes matter-of-factly that Fermat used infinitesimals9
at least in his method of quadrature:
Especially where, in his mature method of quadrature,
Fermat began to operate with infinitesimals and limit
procedures, the reversion to synthesis became, as mathe-
maticians from Newton to Cauchy were to find, far from
easy. [Mahoney 1994, p. 47]
Scholars ranging from Sabetai Unguru to Andre´ Weil10 take it for
granted that Fermat’s technique involves approximate equality. Thus,
Unguru writes in reference to Fermat’s method of tangents:
This computation involved. . . the concept of ‘adequal-
ity’ (taken over from Diophantus), according to which. . .
the two ordinates of (1) an arbitrary point on the tan-
gent other than the point of tangency and (2) the cor-
responding point on the curve determined by the inter-
section of that ordinate and the curve were assumed to
be ‘adequal’ [Unguru 1976, p. 776].
Since the point on the tangent line and the corresponding point on
the curve (with the same ordinate) are in general unequal, we see that
7Though apparently straighforward, Weil’s thesis has been resisted by a small
number of Fermat scholars recently; see Section 2.1.
8We therefore reject Breger’s claim that “[t]he idea that the mathematically
conservative Fermat . . . is supposed to have calculated using infinitesimals is a
bold hypothesis for which there are no textual proofs” [Breger 2013, p. 23].
9Without referring to them explicitly as infinitely small, of course. We should
mention that Mahoney’s interpretation of Fermat’s method of adequality is incom-
patible with ours.
10The pair may be familiar to the reader as the leaders of opposing schools in
the debate over geometric algebra; see e.g., [Weil 1978].
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according to Unguru’s reading, setting them adequal involves an ap-
proximate equality. Unguru comments further:
Initially inspired by Archimedes’ treatment in ‘On spi-
rals’, Fermat later improved and generalized his method
of quadrature by means of a new meaning attached to
the concept of ‘adequality’, now taken to stand for ‘ap-
proximate’ or ‘limiting’ equality. (ibid.)
Similarly, Weil notes that Diophantus uses the Greek term
to designate his way of approximating a given number by
a rational solution to a given problem (cf. e.g.Dioph. V.11
and 14) [Weil 1984, p. 28]. (emphasis added)
According to Weil’s interpretation, approximation is inherent to the
meaning of the original Greek term παρισo´της.
Breger appears to recognize that Leibniz understood Fermat’s method
to be based on infinitesimals, but claims that “the texts available to
Leibniz contained grave contradictions and were hardly suitable for a
clear understanding of the method” [Breger 2013, p. 24]. Yet Breger
acknowledges that Leibniz may have had access to the 1679Varia Opera
edition of Fermat’s collected works (ibid., note 28) and moreover that
Huygens and Leibniz corresponded about the Opera Omnia edition
(ibid., note 31).
1.5. Reception by Huygens. The thesis we develop in the present
text does not depend on considering Fermat’s E as necessarily being
infinitely small. Even if one adopts a purely algebraic interpretation
of Fermat’s techniques including quadrature and adequality (as is emi-
nently possible for some of Fermat’s simpler applications of adequality,
as per Weil’s thesis; see Section 1.4), one can still ask why Fermat,
unlike his contemporaries like Kepler11 and Galileo, chose not to work
explicitly with the infinitely small.
Fermat offered little in the way of explanation of his method of ad-
equality. What are the reasons for Fermat’s evasiveness about the
foundations of his method? Why did Fermat never clarify whether
his E were infinitely small or account for some of his methods in terms
of indivisibles, as Kepler, Galileo, and Cavalieri did? While presenting
11Jean d’Espagnet was interested in the work of Robert Fludd (1574–1637),
whom Kepler had attacked. That alone might have brought d’Espagnet to Kepler’s
books. While it is plausible that d’Espagnet’s library at Bordeaux should have
included Kepler’s works, the question of Kepler’s possible influence on Fermat’s
method is a subject of long-standing scholarly controversy exhaustively covered in
[Cifoletti 1990, pp. 40–60]. For a summary of Kepler’s contribution to infinitesimal
techniques of barrel measuring see [Jongmans 2008].
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an interpretation of Fermat’s method at the French academy, Huygens
commented as follows:
Fermat est le premier homme que je sache qui ait e´tabli
une re`gle certaine pour de´terminer les valeurs maxi-
males et minimales dans les questions ge´ome´triques. En
en recherchant le fondement qu’il n’a pas communique´,
etc. (Huygens cited in [Noe¨l–Trompler 2003]) (emphasis
added)
Most commentators agree with Huygens’ sentiment. Huygens contin-
ued:
. . . j’ai trouve´ en meˆme temps de quelle manie`re cette
re`gle peut eˆtre re´duite a` une brie`vete´ remarquable, de
sorte qu’elle s’accorde de´sormais avec celle donne´e plus
tard par l’honorable Hudde comme une partie de la re`gle
plus ge´ne´rale et fort e´le´gante qui s’appuie sur un tout
autre principe. Cette dernie`re a e´te´ publie´e par Fr. Van
Schooten dans le recueil qui contient aussi les livres de
Descartes sur la ge´ome´trie. Or, ma me´thode d’examiner
la re`gle de Fermat e´tait la suivante. . . (Oeuvres comple`tes,
1940, tome 20). (ibid.)
Huygens’ observation that Fermat did not provide an explanation of
the foundation of his method is echoed by De Gandt:
Fermat et Roberval, pour des raisons tre`s diffe´rentes,
conservent une grande partie de leurs tre´sors dans leurs
papiers personnels. [De Gandt 1992, p. 104]
Concerning Fermat’s limited mathematical output, Spiesser writes:
[Fermat] s’en explique par le manque de temps, . . . et par
‘sa pente naturelle vers la paresse’ (par exemple, Oeu-
vres II, p. 461). Ces arguments, dont le second rele`ve
quelque peu de la coquetterie, lui permettent e´galement
d’excuser son manque d’inte´reˆt pour les expositions de´tail-
le´es des preuves . . . [Spiesser 2016, p. 297]
Spiesser’s assessment of Fermat’s claim of alleged paresse as a kind of
coquetterie is right on target. We will therefore seek deeper reasons for
his apparent evasiveness in explaining his method.
1.6. Our thesis. We shall argue that Fermat’s reticence may have
been due either to a deference to his contemporary catholic theologians
including jesuits who were often opposed to atomism and indivisibles
on doctrinal grounds, or to a possible fear of religious reprisals. If this
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is correct, then Fermat was in similar position to 17th century Italian
mathematicians most of whom forsook indivisibles.12
1.7. Modern proxies. In this and the following sections we outline
a modern formalisation of a relation of adequality and the associated
procedures while keeping in mind the distinction between procedure
and ontology outlined in Section 1.2. Readers already familiar with
this set-theoretic justification of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum
can skip to Section 1.8.
We start with a construction (called an ultrapower) of a hyperreal ex-
tension R →֒ ∗R. Let RN denote the ring of sequences of real numbers,
with arithmetic operations defined termwise. Then we have a totally
ordered field ∗R = RN/MAX where “MAX” is a suitable maximal ideal.
Elements of ∗R are called hyperreal numbers. Note the formal anal-
ogy between the quotient ∗R = RN/MAX and the construction of the
real numbers as equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational
numbers. In both cases, the subfield is embedded in the superfield by
means of constant sequences, and the ring of sequences is factored by
a maximal ideal.
We now describe a construction of such a maximal ideal of RN ex-
ploiting a suitable finitely additive measure ξ : P(N)→ {0, 1} (thus ξ
takes only two values, 0 and 1) taking the value 1 on each cofinite
set,13 where P(N) is the set of subsets of N. The ideal MAX consists
of all “negligible” sequences (un), i.e., sequences which vanish for a set
of indices of full measure ξ, namely, ξ
(
{n ∈ N : un = 0}
)
= 1. The
subset U = Uξ ⊆ P(N) consisting of sets of full measure ξ is called a
free ultrafilter (these can be shown to exist using Zorn’s lemma).
Definition 1.1. The order on ∗R is defined by setting [(un)] < [(vn)]
if and only if ξ({n ∈ N : un < vn}) = 1 or equivalently {n ∈ N : un <
vn} ∈ U .
Example 1.2. An element x ∈ R is embedded in ∗R by means of the
constant sequence with general term x. Let v = [(vn)] ∈
∗R. Then x
satisfies x < v if and only if {n ∈ N : x < vn} ∈ U .
For a broader view of Robinson’s framework see [Fletcher et al. 2017].
Minimal set-theoretic requirements for constructing a definable hyper-
real line are analyzed in [Herzberg et al. 2018].
12A possible exception is the work of Mengoli, cf. [Massa 1997], though Mengoli
carefully avoided the language of indivisibles.
13For each pair of complementary infinite subsets of N, such a measure ξ “de-
cides” in a coherent way which one is “negligible” (i.e., of measure 0) and which is
“dominant” (measure 1).
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1.8. Infinitesimals, adequality, and standard part. Based on the
set-theoretic construction of a hyperreal extension R →֒ ∗R given in
Section 1.7, we introduce some terminology for dealing with infinitesi-
mals.
Definition 1.3. An element E ∈ ∗R is called infinitesimal if for each
positive r ∈ R one has −r < E < r.
Definition 1.4. Hyperreal numbers a, b are said to be infinitely close,
written
a ≈ b,
if their difference a− b is infinitesimal.
It is convenient also to introduce the following terminology and no-
tation. We will use Leibniz’s notation pq .
14 Leibniz used the symbol
to denote a notion of generalized equality “up to” a negligible term,
though he did not distinguish it from the usual symbol “=” which he
also used in the same sense.
Definition 1.5. Hyperreal numbers a, b are said to be adequal, written
a pq b,
if either a
b
≈ 1 or a = b = 0.
Example 1.6. We have sin x pq x for infinitesimal x. While the re-
lation sin x ≈ x for infinitesimal x is immediate from the continuity
of sine at the origin (in fact both sides are infinitely close to 0), the
relation sin x pq x is a subtler relation equivalent to the computation
of the first order Taylor approximation of sine.
The crucial observation is that unlike the relation ≈, the relation pq
has the following property of multiplicative invariance.
Theorem 1.7. The relation pq is multiplicatively invariant in the
sense that if polynomials (or more general expressions) P and Q sat-
isfy P pq Q then also
P
E pq
Q
E
.
Proof. If P
Q
≈ 1 then P/E
Q/E
= EP
EQ
= P
Q
≈ 1, as well. 
An element u ∈ ∗R is called finite if −r < u < r for a suitable r ∈ R.
Let hR ⊆ ∗R be the subring consisting of finite elements of ∗R.
Theorem 1.8. There exists a function st : hR → R called the stan-
dard part that rounds off each finite hyperreal u to its nearest real
number u0 ∈ R, so that u0 = st(u) and u ≈ u0.
14Leibniz actually used a symbol that looks more like ⊓ (see [Katz–Sherry 2013])
but the latter is commonly used to denote a product.
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Proof. The result holds generally for an arbitrary ordered field exten-
sion F of R. Indeed, if x ∈ F is finite, then x induces a Dedekind cut
on the subfield Q ⊆ R ⊆ F via the total order of F . The real number
corresponding to the Dedekind cut is then infinitely close to x. 
Example 1.9. A number E is infinitesimal if and only if st(E) = 0.
1.9. Transcription of Fermat’s argument. Fermat illustrates his
method by solving the following problem: subdivide a given segment
into two subsegments so as to maximize the area of the rectangle formed
by the two subsegments [Fermat 1891, p. 134].
Fermat denotes the length of the original segment by B and the
length of a first subsegment by A, so that the second subsegment is of
length B − A. The expression to be maximized is
BA−A2,
where we used the Cartesian notation for arithmetic operations for
greater readability. Fermat now replaces the first subsegment by A+E
so that the second one becomes B−A−E, with product BA−A2+BE−
2AE−E2. Fermat compares the latter to the previous product BA−A2
and suppresses common terms.
Remark 1.10. At the next stage, Fermat gathers together terms with
of same sign, namely he groups the positive terms together and the
negative terms together.
This enables him to form the adequality
BE adaequabitur 2AE + E2, (1.1)
Dividing out by E, Fermat obtains the adequality
B adaequabitur 2A+ E. (1.2)
Suppressing the remaining term E, Fermat obtains an equality
B aequabitur 2A. (1.3)
Fermat concludes that to solve the problem one needs to take (for A)
half of B.
Remark 1.11. This is one of many instances when the characteristic
pair “adequality, equality” (in that order) occurs in Fermat’s descrip-
tion of his method.
Let us transcribe Fermat’s argument in the language developed in
Section 1.8 by rewriting his sequence of operations in modern notation
as follows:
BE pq 2AE + E
2, (1.4)
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B pq 2A+ E, (1.5)
B = 2A. (1.6)
In terms of modern proxies, the passage from relation (1.4) to rela-
tion (1.5) is justified by Theorem 1.7. The passage from relation (1.5)
to equality (1.6) is justified by applying the standard part function of
Theorem 1.8 using the fact that st(E) = 0.
Remark 1.12. The passage from equation (1.4) to equation (1.5) en-
abled by Theorem 1.7 is only possible if one works with a multiplica-
tively invariant relation pq as we did, rather than with the relation of
infinite proximity ≈ (see Section 1.8).
1.10. Text sent to Descartes. At the outset of a text on Fermat’s
method sent to Descartes toward the end of 1637 and received by the
latter at the beginning of 1638, Fermat starts with a term (expression)
containing an unknown A.15 Fermat goes on to substitute A + E in
place of A, and writes:
Adaequentur, ut loquitur Diophantus, duo homogenea
maximae aut minimae aequalia [Fermat 1891, p. 133]
(see Section 1.11 for details and translation). Following the steps out-
lined in Section 1.3 (and in more detail in Section 1.9), Fermat con-
cludes:
The solution of this last equality will give the value of A,
which known, the maximum or minimum will become
known by repeating the traces of the foregoing resolu-
tion. [Mahoney 1994, p. 162]
It is only at this stage in the algorithm that the unknown A becomes
a constant A, namely the desired point of maximum.16
1.11. Original Latin. The original Latin of the passage on Diophan-
tus cited in Section 1.10 reads as follows:
15In Ad eamdem methodum (item III in [Fermat 1891]), Fermat refers to A as
incognitam (unknown) [Fermat 1891, p. 140]. A text starting with the words “Je
veux par ma me´thode” is a translation (of the above) dating from 1638 in old French
first published in [Fermat 1922]. This text refers to A as an inconnue [Fermat 1922,
p. 74, line 7] and similarly at [Fermat 1922, p. 80, line 4]. Fermat similarly de-
scribes A as inconnue in a 22 october 1638 letter to Mersenne [Fermat 1894, p. 170,
175].
16Thus Breger’s claim to the effect that “in the first text on the method sent
to Descartes, adaequare means equality” [Breger 2013, p. 21] has no basis; see Sec-
tion 2.1.
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Adaequentur, ut loquitur Diophantus, duo homogenea
maximae aut minimae aequalia et, demptis communibus
(quo peracto, homogenea omnia ex parte alterutra ab E
vel ipsius gradibus afficiuntur), etc. [Fermat 1891, p. 133].
Mahoney translates this passage as follows:
Adequate,17 as Diophantus says, the two homogeneous
expressions equal to the maximum or minimum and,
having removed common terms (which done, all homo-
geneous quantities on either side will contain E or de-
grees of it), etc.” [Mahoney 1994, p. 162]
Note that Fermat speaks of two homogeneous expressions equal to the
(i.e., representing the unknown) maximum. He does not speak of two
homogeneous expressions equal to each other.18
1.12. Fermat’s Sur la meˆme me´thode. Fermat’s Latin text Ad
eamdem methodum (item VI in [Fermat 1891]) starts at [Fermat 1891,
p. 158]. We will use Tannery’s translation Sur la meˆme me´thode for
the reader’s convenience. Here we find:
Nous conside´rons en fait dans le plan d’une courbe quel-
conque deux droites donne´es de position, dont on peut
appeler l’une diame`tre, l’autre ordonne´e. Nous sup-
posons la tangente de´ja` trouve´e en un point donne´ sur
la courbe, et nous conside´rons par ade´galite´ la proprie´te´
spe´cifique de la courbe, non plus sur la courbe meˆme,
mais sur la tangente a` trouver. En e´liminant, suivant
notre the´orie des maxima et minima, les termes qui
doivent l’eˆtre, nous arrivons a` une e´galite´ qui de´termine
le point de rencontre de la tangente avec le diame`tre,
par suite la tangente elle-meˆme.19 [Fermat 1896, p. 141]
17Mahoney is using adequate as an English verb; cf. note 5.
18This is contrary to Breger’s claim at [Breger 2013, p. 28, line 3]. Breger re-
produces only a misleadingly truncated fragment of Fermat’s Latin phrase, in foot-
note 50 there to support his dubious claim. Breger’s fragment is “duo homogenea
maximae aut minimae aequalia.” However, Breger’s fragment does not make sense
grammatically, because the words “maximae/minimae” only make sense in Fer-
mat’s full phrase as Datives construed with “aequalia”, namely “two homogeneous
terms equal to the maximum or the minimum”. The two homogeneous expressions
are not equated but rather adequated by Fermat. In the 1638 text mentioned in
note 15 Fermat writes (in old French) explicitly: “comme s’ils estoient esgaux, bien
qu’en effect ils ne le soient pas” [Fermat 1922, p. 74, lines 15–16].
19Latin original: “Consideramus nempe in plano cujuslibet curvae rectas duas
positione datas, quarum altera diameter, si libeat, altera applicata nuncupetur.
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(emphasis on diame`tre and ordonne´e in the 1896 source;
emphasis on ade´galite´ and e´galite´ added)
Here similarly, adequality refers to unknowns, whereas equality refers
to the value of the constant found. Thus Fermat is expressing distinct
ideas when he uses the words adaequalitas and aequalitas. The char-
acteristic pair “adequality, equality” occurs here as elsewhere in that
specific order; see Remark 1.11 on page 12.
[Note added after publication: After the article was published on-
line (see http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10699-017-9542-y) at Foun-
dations of Science, we came across an important piece of evidence
concerning Fermat’s Toulouse friend Lalouve`re, jesuit, mathematician,
and censor. Indeed, Antonella Romano writes: “Un premier constat
regarde les je´suites confronte´s a` la censure: sur tous les cas du Fondo
Gesuitico qui concernent la France, deux professeurs seulement appar-
tiennent a` la liste e´tablie dans le cadre de cet ouvrage, B. Labarthe et
V. Le´otaud. Si d’autres mathe´maticiens y apparaissent, c’est tout aussi
exceptionnellement, et au titre de censeur, comme Antoine Lalouve`re114”
[Romano 1999, p. 512]. Footnote 114 there reads: “C’est lui qui porte
un jugement ne´gatif sur l’ouvrage de B. Labarthe.” Thus, Lalouve`re
in his capacity as a censor sank at least one book, namely that by his
fellow jesuit Labarthe.]
2. Reductive readings
Reductive tendencies in modern historiography of mathematics were
analyzed in [Katz–Katz 2012]; see also Section 2.7. Some Fermat schol-
ars have argued recently that adequality meant equality or setting equal,
that Fermat’s procedure was purely algebraic, and that no idea of ap-
proximation was involved.
2.1. Reductive readings of adequality: Breger. Breger’s reading
along these lines was critically analyzed in [Katz et al. 2013]. That such
scholars are in a distinct minority emerges from the following comment
of Breger’s:
Although there are considerable differences between var-
ious interpretations, there seems to be a common dogma,
to which all interpreters, as far as I know, agree, namely:
Deinde, jam inventam tangentem supponentes ad datum in curva punctum, pro-
prietatem specificam curvae, non in curva amplius, sed in invenienda tangente, per
adaequalitatem consideramus et, elisis (quae monet doctrina de maxima et minima)
homogeneis, fit demum aequalitas quae punctum concursuˆs tangentis cum diametro
determinat, ideoque ipsam tangentem” [Fermat 1891, p. 159].
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Fermat uses the word ‘adaequare’ in the sense of ‘to be
approximately equal’ or ‘to be pseudo-equal’ or ‘to be
counterfactually equal’ [Breger 1994, p. 194]. (emphasis
in the original)
Why is it that “all interpreters,” as reported by Breger, agree that a re-
lation more general than equality and exploiting in some way inequality
is involved in Fermat’s method? Possibly it is because Fermat himself
said so in a letter to Mersenne:
Cette comparaison par ade´galite´ produit deux termes
ine´gaux qui enfin produisent l’e´galite´ (selon ma me´thode),
qui nous donne la solution de la question [Fermat 1638,
p. 137] (emphasis on ade´galite´ in the original; emphasis
on ine´gaux added)
(see Section 2.2 for details). Similar remarks apply to Fermat’s later
missive to Descartes mentioning ade´quation and inequalities involved;
see [Fermat 1894, p. 155]. Meanwhile, Breger claims that
two homogeneous quantities that are each equal to the
maximum or minimum are obviously equal to each other
and not only approximately equal [Breger 2013, p. 21,
note 6].
A similar claim had already appeared in [Breger 1994, p. 195]. Breger’s
inference is based on assuming that the symbol A appearing in Fer-
mat’s argument (see Section 1.10) is a constant rather than an unknown
throughout the argument, but A is clearly an unknown at the outset of
the argument and only becomes a constant at the end, as analyzed in
Sections 1.10 and 1.12. Thus Breger’s inference is based on a confusion
of unknowns and constants.
2.2. Fermat’s letter; enfin. For the sake of completeness we repro-
duce the full passage from Fermat’s letter to Mersenne cited in Sec-
tion 2.1, which uses the term ade´galite´ twice:
6. Outre le papier envoye´ a` R(oberval) et P(ascal),
pour supple´er a` ce qu’il y a de trop concis, il faut que
M. Descartes sache, qu’apre`s avoir tire´ la paralle`le qui
concourt avec la tangente et avec l’axe ou diame`tre des
lignes courbes, je lui donne premie`rement le nom qu’elle
doit avoir comme ayant un de ses points dans la tan-
gente, ce qui se fait par la re`gle des proportions qui se
tire des deux triangles semblables. Apre`s avoir donne´ le
nom, tant a` notre paralle`le qu’a` tous les autres termes
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de la question, tout de meˆme qu’en la parabole, je con-
side`re derechef cette paralle`le, comme si le point qu’elle
a dans la tangente e´toit en effet en la ligne courbe, et
suivant la proprie´te´ spe´cifique de la ligne courbe, je com-
pare cette paralle`le par ade´galite´ avec l’autre paralle`le
tire´e du point donne´ a` l’axe ou diame`tre de la ligne
courbe. Cette comparaison par ade´galite´ produit deux
termes ine´gaux qui enfin produisent l’e´galite´ (selon ma
me´thode), qui nous donne la solution de la question.
[Fermat 1638, p. 137] (emphasis on enfin added)
The adverb enfin indicates that something novel occurs at the end of
the argument that hasn’t been the case earlier: namely, equality. In the
same letter Fermat makes (only a half-)joking reference to “ma petite
guerre contre M. Descartes” (ibid., item 5); one has to assume that
under the circumstances Fermat would have endeavored to provide his
best available explanation of the method.
2.3. Did Tannery tamper with Fermat’s manuscript? A fac-
simile of a page from Fermat’s handwritten manuscript starting with
the words Doctrinam tangentium is reproduced between pages xviii
and xix in [Fermat 1891]. Here Fermat used the term adaequalitatem
once and, two lines later, the term aequalitas once. The characteristic
pair “adequality, equality” (see Remark 1.11) occurs numerous times
throughout Fermat’s writings on the method. Tannery’s transcription
of Fermat’s page appears at [Fermat 1891, pp. 158–159] as part of a
text entitled Ad eamdem methodum (item VI in Tannery’s edition).
The terms in question appear at lines 14 and 16 of page 159 of the
transcription. An editorial note at [Fermat 1891, p. 426] deals with
Tannery’s transcription. The note concerning line 14 states the fol-
lowing: “14 adaequalitatem] aequalitatem Va” [Fermat 1891, p. 426].
Here the abbreviation Va refers to the edition published by Samuel Fer-
mat in 1679 entitled Varia Opera [Fermat 1679], as explained earlier
on the same page 426. The note indicates that Tannery corrected an
error that crept into the Varia Opera edition of 1679 (which replaced
Fermat’s term adaequalitatem by aequalitatem).
We see therefore that Tannery did not attempt to “repair” Fermat’s
handwritten manuscript. Tannery’s transcription, faithful to the orig-
inal, uses adaequalitatem once at line 14 there, and aequalitas once at
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line 16.20 Similarly, Tannery’s French translation [Fermat 1896, p. 141]
(reproduced in Section 1.12 above) uses ade´galite´ once and e´galite´ once.
Breger writes:
The facsimile (Fermat 1891, after XVIII) gives the im-
pression that the manuscript was not written in a hurry;
there are few additions and deletions, and the handwrit-
ing is fair. In two passages of the manuscript, Fermat
expresses the same idea in nearly identical words, but
in [sic] the first time he uses the word adaequalitas,
whereas in the second passage the word aequalitas is
used (Fermat 1891, 159, 162, 426) [Breger 1994, p. 195].
Breger goes on to claim that
the editors of the Oeuvres deemed it necessary to repair
Fermat’s supposed confusion by changing the aequali-
tas into another adaequalitas [but] they nevertheless in-
dicated their change in the critical apparatus (Fermat
1891, 426) [Breger 1994, pp. 195–196].
This refers to an edit on page 162 at line 22, from aequalitas to adae-
qualitas. We will discuss Tannery’s edit in more detail in Section 2.4.
2.4. Breger’s judgment of Tannery. Breger juxtaposes his judg-
ment of a change in the 1679 edition with his judgment of a change in
Tannery’s 1891 edition in the following terms:
The editors of (Fermat 1679) present a version which
has been changed the other way round: They give twice
aequalitas, whereas (Fermat 1891) gives twice adaequal-
itas. [Breger 1994, p. 196].
Breger’s tone is even more strident in his 2013 article:
In the only manuscript on the method of maxima, min-
ima and tangents that has been handed down to us in
Fermat’s own handwriting, aequalitas and adaequalitas
are used interchangeably. Unfortunately, the editors of
the Fermat edition have interfered with the text to sup-
port their own interpretation of the method and they
20For the sake of completeness we reproduce lines 14, 15, 16, and 17 exactly as
they appear in [Fermat 1891, p. 159]:
(14) in invenienda tangente, per adaequalitatem consideramus et, elisis
(15) (quae monet doctrina de maxima et minima) homogeneis, fit demum
(16) aequalitas quae punctum concursuˆs tangentis cum diametro determinat,
(17) ideoque ipsam tangentem.
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have declared the text in Fermat’s handwriting to be
flawed. [Breger 2013, p. 22] (emphasis added)
Breger’s claim that Fermat used aequalitas and adaequalitas inter-
changeably is unsupported by evidence. In fact, Fermat uses them
in distinct senses on the page in Fermat’s handwriting reproduced be-
tween xviii and xix in [Fermat 1891], and accurately transcribed by
Tannery on page 159. The term adequality always occurs in tandem
with equality with the former denoting a comparison of expressions
involving unknowns and the latter, an expression for the constant pro-
viding the final answer. Whenever Fermat presents a detailed solution,
the characteristic pair “adequality, equality” invariably appears; see
Remark 1.11 on page 12.
Breger’s comment at [Breger 1994, p. 196] cited above is equally crit-
ical of the changes by the 1679 editors and by the 1891 editors. How-
ever, the change made by the 1679 edition at [Fermat 1679, p. 69] was
an erroneous replacement of adaequalitatem by aequalitatem, contrary
both to the version found in Fermat’s handwritten manuscript (see Sec-
tion 2.3) and to Fermat’s description of his method in the text sent to
Descartes and appearing at [Fermat 1891, p. 133]; see Section 1.10.
Namely, the edit by the 1679 editors disrupted the characteristic
pair “adequality, equality.” Such a pair appears in Fermat’s detailed
presentation of a solution on numerous occasions, including Fermat’s
usage recorded on page 159 (of the 1891 edition) and Fermat’s usage
recorded on page 163 (of the 1891 edition) on the cycloid (“curva Do-
mini de Roberval”); see Section 1.3. Therefore the change on page 69
of the 1679 edition constituted an editorial error.
Meanwhile, the change made by Tannery in a passage on page 162,
line 22 replacing aequalitas by adaequalitas concerns a stand-alone oc-
currence of the term (rather than as part of the characteristic pair) in
a brief concluding passage, which we reproduce in translation for the
reader’s convenience:
Enfin, ce qui est le point important, aux arcs de courbes
on peut substituer les longueurs correspondantes des
tangentes de´ja` trouves, et arriver a` l’ade´galite´,21 comme
nous l’avons indique´ : on satisfera ainsi facilement a` la
question.22 [Fermat 1896, p. 143–144]
21Some of the extant texts have e´galite´ instead.
22Latin original: “et demum (quod operae pretium est) portiones tangentium
jam inventarum pro portionibus curvae ipsis subjacentis sumantur, et procedat
adaequalitas ut supra monuimus: proposito nullo negotio satisfiet.” [Fermat 1891,
p. 162]
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Some of the extant texts for this passage have aequalitas and others
have adaequalitas, and editor Tannery chose to go with the latter. Tan-
nery appropriately indicated the existence of alternative versions in an
editorial note at [Fermat 1891, p. 426] concerning page 162, line 22.
Either term would fit here, and the choice does not affect the interpre-
tation of the method.
Breger implies that the 1679 and the 1891 editors were equally guilty
of tampering with Fermat’s original but Breger’s judgment of Tannery’s
scholarship is biased by Breger’s own quest to account for adequality
in terms of the double root idea; see Remark 2.3 on page 22.
2.5. Cherry-picked numerology. The numerology of Breger’s com-
ment to the effect that “The editors of (Fermat 1679) present a version
which has been changed the other way round: They give twice aequal-
itas, whereas (Fermat 1891) gives twice adaequalitas” [Breger 1994,
p. 196] is surprising if not to say incomprehensible. Where does the
number 2 as in “[t]hey give twice aequalitas, whereas (Fermat 1891)
gives twice adaequalitas” come from?
The handwritten manuscript transcribed at [Fermat 1891, p. 158–
167] uses the term adaequalitatem (or adaequetur, adaequalitas, adae-
quari) no fewer than 10 times.23 Even if one takes off the one occurrence
on page 162 that Breger is unhappy about, that still leaves us with nine
occurrences of the term in Fermat’s handwritten manuscript.
Breger’s number 2 seems to be cherry-picked so as to attack Tan-
nery’s editing by comparing it to that of the 1679 edition.
2.6. Breger’s wrong move. We will now illustrate how a scholar
working in an infinitesimal-frei conceptual framework misses important
features of Fermat’s method. Let us consider Breger’s transcription of
Fermat’s argument presented in Section 1.9. Breger writes:
The maximum of BA−A2 is to be found. Fermat puts
BA− A2 = B(A+ E)− (A+ E)2 (2.1)
2AE + E2 − BE = 0 (2.2)
E(2A+ E −B) = 0 (2.3)
. . . The procedure consists of three steps: Firstly, two
functional expressions for the extreme value are equated;
then one divides by E . . . in the third step E is put
equal to zero. [Breger 2013, p. 27] (equation numbers
added)
23More precisely, the term occurs once on each of the pages 159, 160, 161, three
times on 162, twice on 163, and twice on 164.
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Breger mentions the steps involving the division by E and setting E
equal to zero, but does not include the resulting relations, so we will
do it for him, following the style of his formulas (2.1), (2.2), (2.3):
2A+ E −B = 0 (2.4)
and then
2A− B = 0. (2.5)
What is striking about Breger’s paraphrase is its insensitivity to the
details of Fermat’s mathematical presentation. Breger’s relation (2.1) is
true to Fermat but already Breger’s next relation (2.2) betrays Fermat.
Remark 2.1. As is evident from our summary in Section 1.9, Fermat
never moved the terms to the left-hand side as Breger did. In fact,
Fermat wrote: “aequentur sane . . . negata affirmatis” [Fermat 1891,
p. 134] which Mahoney translates as “equate . . . the negative terms to
the positive” [Mahoney 1994, p. 162]; see Remark 1.10. Breger’s wrong
move makes Fermat’s procedures appear unclear or even confused, as
we now show.
The transition from Breger’s relation (2.2) to relation (2.3) is an un-
problematic algebraic transformation using the distributive law. How-
ever, Breger’s next step is problematic and in fact untenable.
Remark 2.2. The transition from Breger’s relation (2.3) to Breger’s
relation (2.4) can be justified neither in terms of the relation ≈ nor
in terms of the relation pq ; see Remark 1.12. Nor did Fermat use 0
appearing on Breger’s right-hand side.
If one wishes to interpret relation (2.4) as true equality as Breger
does, the passage from (2.4) to (2.5) becomes incomprehensible. More
precisely, it forces E = 0 and invalidates any possible passage from
(2.3) to (2.4).
Breger is “shocked” at [Breger 2013, pp. 25–26] by He´rigone’s Cursus
mathematicus which if interpreted literally appears to present a version
of Fermat’s method where one patently divides by zero to obtain the
final result. Yet Breger’s own flawed paraphrase at [Breger 2013, p. 27]
similarly relies on E being first nonzero and then zero.
Breger declares that “for the sake of clarity a . . . = 0 is occasionally
used, although Fermat himself avoids using it” [Breger 2013, p. 29] but
what Breger introduced by tampering with Fermat’s presentation is
not clarity but rather confusion.
In 1642, He´rigone presented the same example while retaining Fer-
mat’s balanced presentation:
2ae+ e2 2|2 eb,
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followed by
2a+ e 2|2 b,
and finally
2a 2|2 b
(here 2|2 denotes an equality sign) as found in [He´rigone 1642, p. 60].
To his credit, [Barner 2011, p. 18] treats the same example without
distorting Fermat’s method the way Breger does by moving the terms
to the left-hand side.
Remark 2.3. Why did Breger move the terms to the left-hand side so
as to obtain the formula 2AE +E2−BE = 0 as in (2.2), whereas nei-
ther Fermat nor his popularizer He´rigone did? The polynomial 2AE +
E2 − BE has a double root when A = B/2. Breger seeks a uniform
interpretation of Fermat’s method in terms of the double root idea. But
this is not Fermat’s way. The double root idea is present in Fermat’s
work but the method of adequality is more general and some of its ap-
plications resist Breger’s reductive paraphrase. Imagine what Unguru
might think of such a left-handed move.
2.7. Triumvirate bias. Carl Boyer referred to Cantor, Dedekind and
Weierstrass (CDW) as “the great triumvirate” in [Boyer 1949]. A ha-
giographic attitude toward CDW tends to go hand-in-hand with a dis-
trust of mathematics that CDW were unable to formalize, such as
infinitesimals.
Thus, volume 4 of Fermat’s collected works contains the following
dismissive comments by A. Aubry concerning Kepler and Cavalieri:
[Fermat] semble admettre ainsi, comme Kepler et Cava-
lieri, l’existence re´elle des infiniment petits, et ce principe
que deux quantite´s ne diffe´rant que d’un infiniment pe-
tit sont e´gales; tandis qu’au contraire Descartes se fonde
sur la the´orie des racines e´gales, c’est-a`-dire, au fond, sur
celle des limites”24 [Fermat 1912, p. 225].
Aubry clearly has little confidence in “really existing infinitesimals” or
for that matter in a relation of generalized equality between quantities
differing by an infinitesimal.
Scholars trained in the traditional Weierstrassian framework based
upon the real continuum tend to privilege such a framework over other
modern frameworks even when the latter are procedurally closer to the
pioneering epoch of analysis. Breger frequently mentions the following
two points in close proximity to each other:
24From an editorial comment on page 145 in the same volume it emerges that
Aubry developed his remarks (in Note XXV) especially for the 1912 volume.
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(1) the concept of approximate equality, and
(2) the issue of Fermat being unclear, confused, or contradictory.
Such juxtaposition suggests the existence of an implied connection be-
tween the two points in Breger’s mind. Thus, he writes:
2.7.1. “The commonly accepted interpretations of Fermat’s method
of extreme values tell us that this is a curious method, based on an
approximate equality and burdened with several contradictions within
Fermat’s writings.” [Breger 1994, p. 139] (emphasis added)
2.7.2. “Although there are considerable differences between various
interpretations, there seems to be a common dogma, to which all in-
terpreters, as far as I know, agree, namely: Fermat uses the word
‘adaequare’ in the sense of ‘to be approximately equal’ . . . Usually,
the explicit or tacit assumption is made that Fermat himself was some-
what confused.” [Breger 1994, p. 194] (emphasis added)
2.7.3. “In two passages of the manuscript, Fermat expresses the same
idea in nearly identical words, but in [sic] the first time he uses the word
adaequalitas, whereas in the second passage the word aequalitas is used
(Fermat 1891, 159, 162, 426). If the dogma of the usual interpretation is
assumed, then this is another example of Fermat’s supposed confusion.”
[Breger 1994, p. 195] (emphasis added)
2.7.4. “Looking at these oddities, we finally arrive at an alternative
and at a warning. The alternative is: Either Fermat was pretty con-
fused - far more confused than a mathematician presenting one of
his central ideas is expected to be - or something is fundamentally
wrong with our understanding of Fermat’s method of extreme values.”
[Breger 1994, p. 196] (emphasis added)
Breger’s tone becomes progressively more strident:
2.7.5. “There is no approximate equality involved in Fermat’s insight
and in his application of the Diophantus passage. Thus I would like to
conclude that these words were written by someone who did not really
understand the meaning of Fermat’s reference to Diophantus. . . . It
seems hard to believe that Fermat could have been so confused as to
write this rubbish.” [Breger 1994, p. 210] (emphasis added)
2.7.6. “The text’s contradictoriness cannot be remedied by using words
such as ‘approxiately equal, conterfactually equal, pseudoequal, limit
process, infinite approximation, infinitesimal’ in their interpretation. If
one finds it hard to believe that Fermat had repeatedly got caught up
in contradictions, etc.” [Breger 2013, p. 20] (emphasis added)
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The following passage is particularly revealing of Breger’s assump-
tion that an approximate equality cannot be part of a proper proof :
2.7.7. “[Fermat] knew that an approximate equation was different
from a proven convergence (even though he did not yet have the word
convergence), and it would be most strange if he had not distinguished
the one from the other.” [Breger 2013, p. 23] (emphasis added)
These passages juxtaposing the idea of approximation and the idea of
confusion reveal Breger’s manifest belief that viewing Fermat as using
any version of approximate equality is inevitably tied in with viewing
Fermat as using arguments that were only approximately correct and
thus vague or confused.
Scholars trained in the Weierstrassian school tend to assume that
any relation of approximate equality necessarily constitutes a vague or
even confused concept from a strictly mathematical viewpoint. This
type of bias results from the fact that no such relation is available in
the context of the real continuum. However, such relations are indeed
available in infinitesimal-enriched frameworks; see Section 1.9.
2.8. Breger’s equivocation. Breger’s interpretation is based on an
equivocation on the meaning of Fermat’s term. Breger seeks to assign
two distinct meanings to the term adequality :
(1) simple coincidence and/or equivalence;
(2) “setting equal” in the sense elaborated by Breger in his paper.
Breger’s claim that Fermat used the terms equality and adequality in-
terchangeably is only plausible if based on the sense (1). However,
Breger himself explains the term adequality in the sense (2) relying
on a theorem he states at [Breger 2013, p. 29] exploiting expressions
like (f(x, g(x)) and bearing a close resemblance to an implicit function
theorem; Barner explicitly admits using such a 19th century result in
[Barner 2011, p. 17].
2.9. Fermat versus Breger. We bring the following comparison to
our readers’ attention.
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Fermat to Mersenne: ‘Cette
comparaison par ade´galite´ pro-
duit deux termes ine´gaux qui
enfin produisent l’e´galite´ (selon
ma me´thode), qui nous donne
la solution de la question.’
[Fermat 1638, p. 137]
Breger: ‘Fermat’s method is
not to be located in the re-
gion of approximations. . . It has
nothing to do with an approx-
imate equality, and thus lacks
any basis for assumptions about
limit processes or infinitesimals.’
[Breger 2013, p.40]
2.10. A self-inflicted textual difficulty. In his text Ad eamdem
methodum (item III in [Fermat 1891]), Fermat speaks of comparison
by adequality :
Comparanda sunt ergo homogenea notata signo +cum
iis quae notantur signo−, et iterare comparationem [adae-
qualitatem] oportet inter B in Eq. + B in A in E bis
ex una parte, et A in Eq. ter + Aq. in E ter + Ec. ex
altera. [Fermat 1891, pp. 140–141] (emphasis added)
Note that the brackets around adaequalitatem are Tannery’s (they are
not to be found in Samuel Fermat’s edition [Fermat 1679, p. 66]). In
footnote 1 on page 141, Tannery notes that the text may not be au-
thentic since Fermat should have written only one of the two words,
which according to Tannery Fermat used as synonyms:
Le texte ve´ritable est douteux: Fermat n’a duˆ e´crire que
l’un des deux mots, comparationem ou adaequalitatem,
qu’il employait comme synonymes; l’autre serait une
glose du copiste ou du possesseur de l’original. Meˆme
remarque pour comparatio et adaequalitas, quatre lignes
plus bas. [Fermat 1891, p. 141, note 1] (emphasis in the
original)
But in de Waard’s volume we find Fermat’s French translation of this
text, where Fermat again speaks of comparison by adequality :
Il faut donc comparer les homoge`nes qui sont marquez
du signe + avec ceux qui sont marquez du signe −, et
faire derechef comparaison adaequalitatem entre B in
Eq. + B in A in E bis d’un coste´, et A in Eq. ter +
Aq. in E ter + Ec. de l’autre. [Fermat 1922, p. 75]
(emphasis in the original)
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This time it is editor de Waard’s turn to add a footnote 1 concerning
alleged textual difficulties, without however adding brackets around
adaequalitatem.
In fact there is no difficulty here since Fermat is using comparison
in a generic sense of the word, whereas he is using adequality as the
specific technical term exploited in his method, as he writes:
. . . et i’ay appele´ en mon escrit latin cette sorte de
comparaison adeaqualitatem . . . [Fermat 1922, p. 74]
Moreover, in his remarks about Diophantus in [Fermat 1891, p. 140]
[Fermat 1922, p. 74], Fermat also uses both words but here Tannery
and, following him, de Waard do not protest.
It seems that recognizing the possibility that Fermat fully intended
to use both words (comparison by adequality) involves imagining a
mathematically precise notion of generalized equality different from
the generic sense of comparison, an idea apparently not easy in a world
of post-Weierstrassian historiography.
2.11. Reductive readings of adequality: Felgner. Ulrich Felgner
for his part focuses on examples reducible to a polynomial which is
positive in a neighborhood of a zero at h = 0, and seeks to account
for all these examples based on his interpretation of παρισo´της in
[Felgner 2016]. However, he is unable to account for Fermat’s treat-
ment of transcendental curves like the cycloid, a difficulty one would
expect in light of Weil’s thesis; see Section 1.4.
2.12. Reductive readings of adequality: Barner. In an odd twist
of Fermat scholarship, Klaus Barner appears to hold that he understood
Fermat’s method better than. . . Fermat himself. Barner claims that
Fermat’s attempt to explain his method of calculating the tangent at a
given point of a curve is somewhat confusing (!), that Fermat actually
calculates with a secant line which converges to the tangent as the
limit line, and that Fermat’s problem is that he calculates with secants
without being aware of that ; cf. [Barner 2011, pp. 32–36].
The problem with Barner’s approach is not merely that, as he seems
to acknowledge, there is no evidence for his secant hypothesis in Fer-
mat’s texts, but also that the secant approach is known as Jean Beau-
grand’s rather than Fermat’s, as analyzed in [Strømholm 1968, pp. 64–
65] and noted in [Katz et al. 2013]. In fact, Barner’s secant reading is
not new. Cifoletti writes:
[Zeuthen] fait re´fe´rence a` une se´cante, (qui approximerait
la tangente). Cela est surprenant, puisqu’il n’y a aucun
texte de Fermat sur lequel appuyer cette interpretation.
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Bien entendu, la version de Beaugrand suit cette ap-
proche [Cifoletti 1990, p. 47].
The Zeuthen–Barner reading of Fermat’s method has not been accepted
by modern Fermat scholars.
3. Historical setting
A review of the historical setting at the time of Fermat’s activity
in mathematics will necessarily involve his professional activities as
member of the Parliament of Toulouse.
3.1. Salient historical points. The 11 relevant points are as follows.
3.1.1. Parliament. The modern connotations of the term Parliament
should not mislead one into thinking about 17th-century Toulouse in
terms of modern political concepts. In the 17th century the doctrine
of the separation of powers was not even conceived, let alone imple-
mented, in the Western world. The Parliament of Toulouse was the
local judicial, legislative, and executive power rolled into one, and sub-
ordinate only to the king of France.
3.1.2. Venality. Fermat, like just about everybody else who served in
the Parliament, had to pay a hefty fee25 for the privilege.
3.1.3. Counterreformation. This was the period of counter-reformation,
when the interdenominational strife was at its height. Fermat was
catholic but his parents had some protestant sympathies.26 Fermat’s
“mixed” background was to influence the trajectory of his professional
activities as well.
25Of 43500 livres [Mahoney 1994, p. 16] in Fermat’s case. At the time all public
functions were sold under certain conditions [Mousnier 1971].
26Fermat’s probable mother, Claire ne´e de Long, came from a Huguenot fam-
ily from Montauban, a Huguenot stronghold [Gairin 2001]. His wife (and distant
cousin) Louyse was also a de Long ([Mouranche 2017] prefers the spelling “Louise”
while Codicille au testament de Pierre de Fermat uses the spelling “Louyse”
[Chabbert 1967, p. 347]). In addition, Fermat had close protestant friends in
the Chambre d’E´dit at Castres, namely Pierre Saporta and Jacques de Ranchin
[Chabbert 1967]. The claim that Fermat “was baptized (and most probably born)
on 20 August 1601 to Dominique Fermat . . . and his wife Claire, ne´e de Long”
[Mahoney 1994, p. 15] is incorrect, since we know that in 1603 Dominique was still
married to Franc¸oise Cazeneuve [Spiesser 2008, p. 172]. Claire de Long’s grandfa-
ther Jean de l’Hospital was a Huguenot expelled from the Parliament for religious
reasons; see Section 5.1.
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3.1.4. Castres. Whereas Fermat was based at Toulouse, he paid fre-
quent visits to the city of Castres starting in 1638 [Chabbert 1967,
p. 340] with protestant leanings, in his function as member of the
Chambre de l’E´dit27 of the Parliament of Toulouse. This was done
in his capacity as negotiator of catholic/protestant tensions; see Sec-
tion 5.
3.1.5. Eucharist and atomism. One of the stickiest points of the catho-
lic/protestant disagreement concerns the doctrine of the eucharist (see
Section 4.8). What is relevant as far as Fermat’s mathematics is con-
cerned is that the theory of atomism and kindred doctrines were viewed
by some catholic theologians as a threat to their interpretation of the
doctrine of the eucharist; see Section 4.10 on Trent 13.2.
3.1.6. Atomism and indivisibles. Perhaps through careless choice of
wording by Cavalieri in his correspondence with Galileo and others,
atomism was closely associated with mathematical indivisibles.28 Cav-
alieri belonged to the order of the jesuats, which was an older order
than the jesuit order and something of a rival. Jesuit Guldin attacked
Cavalieri both for allegedly plagiarizing Kepler and for an alleged fun-
damental incoherence of Cavalieri’s technique exploiting indivisibles.
3.1.7. Indivisibles and infinitesimals. Modern scholars distinguish care-
fully between indivisibles and infinitesimals but in the 17th century the
situation was less clearcut. Similarly, there was no clear-cut distinction
at the time between physical indivisibles and mathematical indivisibles.
The distinction commonly made today follows [Koyre´ 1954] (among
others). The distinction is that indivisibles are codimension-one enti-
ties29 whereas infinitesimals are of the same dimension as the entity
they make up (curve, planar region, etc). The term infinitesimal was
coined by either Mercator or Leibniz in the 1670s; see [Leibniz 1699,
p. 63]. Similarly, there was no clear-cut distinction at the time between
physical indivisibles and mathematical indivisibles. Festa observes:
L’atomisme e´tait meˆle´ a` ces discussions car les je´suites,
ceux du Collegio Romano surtout, ne faisaient pas grande
27This refers to the Edit de Nantes (1598) or the Edict of Nantes, where a com-
promise was reached between catholics and protestants that held until its abolition
in 1685 by the l’Etat, c’est Moi (The State, it isMyself ) king who apparently found
no room within either his catholic self or his State for protestantism.
28Lalouve`re specifically complained about this choice of terminology, as noted
in [Descotes 2015, p. 269].
29This means that the dimension of the entity is one less than the dimension of
the ambient figure.
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distinction entre ‘milieux ge´ome´triques’ et ‘milieux phy-
siques’ lorsqu’il s’agissait de manifester leur opposition
a` la notion de ‘discontinuite´’ [Festa 1991, p. 103].
There was apparently a close connection, in the eyes of the catholic
clergy, among atoms, indivisibles, and the infinitely small.
3.1.8. Anti-infinitesimal bans. Festa documents a series of bans issued
by the jesuit establishment against indivisibles, including one in 1632,
the year Galileo received a summons to stand trial over heliocentrism;
see [Festa 1990] and [Festa 1992, p. 207]. Only a few years earlier
(around 1629) Fermat developed the technique of adequality at Bor-
deaux.
3.1.9. Degli Angeli. Cavalieri’s student (or student’s student via Tor-
ricelli) Stefano degli Angeli was also a member of the order of the
jesuats. He published many books on indivisibles, and also published
several spirited, and sometimes strongly worded, defenses of indivisi-
bles against attacks by jesuit scholars like Paul Guldin, Mario Bettini,
and Andre´ Tacquet [Redondi 1987, p. 291]. In 1668 the order of the
jesuats was banned by papal brief, providing essentially no explana-
tion. Degli Angeli lived many years afterwards and published many
additional books, but he never published another word on indivisibles.
3.1.10. Gregory. James Gregory was degli Angeli’s student during his
stay in Padua from 1664 until 1668. Gregory’s books were suppressed
in Venice around 1668 or 1669; see Section 4.7.
3.1.11. Lalouve`re. Fermat was in contact with the jesuit Antoine Lalou-
ve`re at Toulouse who was interested in mathematics (though the latter
was absent from Toulouse between 1632 and 1640). Starting in 1658
Fermat helped Lalouve`re with part of the latter’s submission to the con-
test of the roulette (to determine the area of regions defined in terms
of the cycloid curve) launched anonymously by Pascal (and eventually
won by Pascal). Via Lalouve`re and other channels, Fermat would have
been aware of the jesuits’ position on indivisibles and related doctrines.
3.2. The 17th century scientific context. Most scholars acknowl-
edge that infinitesimal analysis was a natural outgrowth of the tech-
niques of indivisibles as developed by Galileo’s student Cavalieri, and
in fact Galileo’s own work may be closer to the infinitesimal techniques
of their contemporary Kepler.
Earlier authors used other terms. Thus, Kepler referred to a point of
the circumference of the circle as a basis quantulacunque; to a straight
line, as an areola; a rotating axis moved minimum about itself, etc.
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Yet he meant what we would call today the infinitely small. Galileo
spoke of non-quanta [Bascelli 2014a], [Bascelli 2014b]. Other authors
referred either to infinite parva or various translations thereof of type
infinitely small, infiniment petit, etc.
Ingegno discusses 17th century atomism, vacuum, and the related
theological difficulties in the following terms:
Le vide renvoyait aux positions atomistiques qui, dans
l’e´cole galile´enne, s’appuyaient sur l’enseignement du
maˆıtre. Il s’agit en particulier de l’enseignement dis-
pense´ par Galile´e de´ja` aˆge´. . . Les discussions europe´ennes
sur le vide ne pouvaient qu’accentuer les critiques an-
tiaristote´liciennes30 et les difficulte´s the´ologiques qui ap-
porteront bientoˆt des arguments solides aux adversaires
des nouvelles orientations” [Ingegno 2002, p. 313–314].
The theological difficulties involved included the eucharist:
nous ne savons pas grand-chose de la de´fense de l’atomisme
tente´e par Rossetti pour surmonter les difficulte´s que
cette doctrine soulevait pour une interpre´tation tradi-
tionnelle du Myste`re de l’Eucharistie. (ibid.)
Indivisibles similarly were perceived as a theological threat and opposed
on doctrinal grounds in the 17th century [Feingold 2003]. The oppo-
sition was spearheaded by clerics and more specifically by the jesuits.
Tracts opposing indivisibles were composed by jesuits Paul Guldin,
Mario Bettini, and Andre´ Tacquet [Redondi 1987, p. 291]. P. Mancosu
writes:
Guldin is taking Cavalieri to be composing the contin-
uum out of indivisibles, a position rejected by the Aris-
totelian orthodoxy as having atomistic implications. . . .
Against Cavalieri’s proposition that “all the lines” and
“all the planes” are magnitudes - they admit of ratios
- Guldin argues that “all the lines . . . of both figures
30Being contrary to Aristotle was viewed as a serious offense by the catholic
hierarchy. Thus, part of jesuit Biancani’s book was censored on the grounds that
“The addition to Father Biancani’s book about bodies moving in water should
not be published since it is an attack on Aristotle and not an explanation of him
(as the title indicates). Neither the conclusion nor the arguments to prove it are
due to the author, but to Galileo. And it is enough that they can be read in
Galileo’s writings. It does not seem to be either proper or useful for the books of
our members to contain the ideas of Galileo, especially when they are contrary to
Aristotle.” (quoted in [De Ceglia 2003, p. 162])
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are infinite; but an infinite has no proportion or ratio to
another infinite.” [Mancosu 1996, p. 54]
Tacquet for his part declared that the idea of quantity composed of
indivisibles makes war upon geometry to such an extent, that if it is
not to destroy it, it must itself be destroyed; see [Festa 1992, p. 205],
[Alexander 2014, p. 119].
4. Social, religious, and military 17th century
background
In this section we seek to present the social, religious, and military
background of the first half of the 17th century Italy and France. This
background helps understand the professional and religious constraints
Fermat was operating under.
4.1. Bans on indivisibles. In 1632 (the year Galileo received sum-
mons to stand trial over heliocentrism) the Society’s Revisors General
led by Jakob Bidermann banned teaching indivisibles in their colleges
[Festa 1990], [Festa 1992, p. 198, 207]. The proposition and the ban
read as follows:
Continuum permanens potest constare ex solis indivisi-
bilibus physicis, seu corpusculis atomis, habentibus partes
mathematicas, in ipsis designabiles, etiamsi realiter dicta
corpuscula inter se distinguantur. Tempus quoque ex
instantibus, & qualitates intensae, ex solis gradis indi-
visibilibus constant.
Hanc propositionem arbitramur, non modo repugnare
communi Aristotelis doctrina, sed etiam secundum se
esse improbabilem, etc. [Festa 1992, p. 207]
This can be translated as follows:
A permanent continuum may consist of physical indi-
visibles, or minimal particles, alone, which have math-
ematical parts that can be designated by themselves:
even though in reality the said particles are distinct from
each other. Time, too, [consists] of instants, and intense
qualities31 consist of indivisible grades alone.
31This refers to a scholastic dispute as to whether qualities that differ in intensity
differ in number: is there a numerical difference between the anger of a person who
is very angry and one who is only slightly so?
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We consider that this proposition not only stands in
opposition to the common doctrine of Aristotle,32 but is
also improbable in itself, etc.
Referring to this ban, Feingold notes:
Six months later, General Vitelleschi formulated his strong
opposition to mathematical atomism in a letter he dis-
patched to Ignace Cappon in Dole: “As regards the
opinion on quantity made up of indivisibles, I have al-
ready written to the Provinces many times that it is in
no way approved by me and up to now I have allowed no-
body to propose it or defend it.” [Feingold 2003, pp. 28–
29] (emphasis added)
To dispel any remaining doubts, Vitelleschi put his foot down:
“If it has ever been explained or defended, it was done
without my knowledge. Rather, I demonstrated clearly
to Cardinal Giovanni de Lugo himself that I did not
wish our members to treat or disseminate that opinion.”
(ibid.)
Indivisibles were placed on the Society’s list of permanently banned
doctrines in 1651 [Hellyer 1996]. One might wonder why a society ded-
icated to furthering the pope’s cause on the battlefield of ideas would
be interested in mathematics in the first place, whether Euclidean or
otherwise. As Amir Alexander colorfully puts it, “Ignatius of Loyola,
founding father of the Society . . . was not enamored of mathematics”
[Alexander 2014, p. 52]. The answer, as argued by Alexander, is Clav-
ius. It was C. Clavius (1538–1612) who engineered the acceptance of
the new calendar by pope Gregory 13 and the catholic clergy. The
development of the calendar patently required a great deal of mathe-
matical competence. Riding the wave of that success, Clavius was able
to convince the jesuit hierarchy to incorporate Euclid into their basic
curriculum.
4.2. “Vide inte´gral”. The holy war led by jesuits Bettini, Bider-
mann, Grassi, Guldin, Inchofer, Pallavicino, Tacquet, Vitelleschi, and
others to purge Italy of atoms and indivisibles bore fruit, and by 1700
Italy was a mathematical desert:
en 1700, c’est le vide inte´gral en ce qui concerne la pra-
tique des mathe´matiques nouvelles en Italie. . . [Robinet 1991,
p. 183]
32This passage of the ban alludes to the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism;
see note 30.
FERMAT’S DILEMMA: WHY DID HE KEEP MUM ON INFINITESIMALS? 33
It took a sustained multi-year campaign orchestrated by Leibniz and
mobilizing everybody from Varignon in Paris, Johann Bernoulli in
Basel, the Hanover ambassador Bothmer, to Army Chief Schulenburg
in order to install a leibnizian oltramontani, Jakob Hermann and sub-
sequently Nicolas Bernoulli, in the mathematics chair at Padua, even-
tually sparking a mathematical renaissance in Italy:
L’enseignement d’Hermann a` la chaire de mathe´matiques
de Padoue est reconstituable graˆce aux apports de plu-
sieurs fonds . . . Les annonces des Rotuli de l’universite´
concernent les intitule´s des cours annuels, qui changent
totalement de ce a` quoi on e´tait habitue´ et qui ne s’en
tiennent plus aux commentaires traditionnels de la ge´o-
me´trie d’Euclide. [Robinet 1991, p. 186]
The jesuits, unfazed, stuck to their Euclidean guns. The effects of anti-
indivisible bans were still felt in the 18th century, when most jesuit
mathematicians adhered to the methods of Euclidean geometry, to the
exclusion of the new infinitesimal methods:
. . . le grand nombre des mathe´maticiens de [l’Ordre] resta
jusqu’a` la fin du XVIIIe sie`cle profonde´ment attache´ aux
me´thodes euclidiennes. [Bosmans 1927, p. 77]
4.3. Grassi and Guldin. A critique of Galileo’s indivisibles penned
by jesuit Orazio Grassi is described by Redondi as follows:
As for light - composed according to Galileo of indivis-
ible atoms, more mathematical than physical - in this
case, logical contradictions arise. Such indivisible atoms
must be finite or infinite. If they are finite, mathemati-
cal difficulties would arise. If they are infinite, one runs
into all the paradoxes of the separation to infinity which
had already caused Aristotle33 to discard the atomist
theory. . . [Redondi 1987, p. 196]
This criticism appeared in the first edition of Grassi’s book Ratio pon-
derum librae et simbellae, published in Paris in 1626. According to
Redondi, this criticism of Grassi’s
exhumed a discounted argument, copied word-for-word
from almost any scholastic philosophy textbook. . . The
Jesuit mathematician [Paul] Guldin, great opponent of
the geometry of indivisibles, and an excellent Roman
friend of [Orazio] Grassi, must have dissuaded him from
repeating such obvious objections. Thus the second
33 See note 30 on the role of aristotelianism.
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edition of the Ratio, the Neapolitan edition of 1627,
omitted as superfluous the whole section on indivisibles.
[Redondi 1987, p. 197]
Grassi and Guldin may have disagreed about the tactics of fighting
indivisibles, but they agreed about the need to do so (see also Sec-
tion 4.10).
4.4. War and pope. There is an aspect of political history that is
essential for understanding the background for the events surrounding
Galileo’s trial. The protestant Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus was
routing the catholic Habsburgs on the battlefields of Germany until the
situation came to a head in 1632 when he seemed to threaten Rome
itself.
The pope Urban 8 was faced with a situation close to a coup d’etat
vis-a-vis a group of cardinals led by the Spanish ambassador. At this
point in time the pope was forced to reorient his policies away from the
French who had been allied with the Swedes, and toward the Spanish,
with the jesuits gaining greatly in influence.
At the same time Galileo’s fortunes sank. The ascendancy of the
jesuits was manifest by the 1633 trial of Galileo (see Section 4.5), for-
merly a prote´ge´ of the pope, and the active suppression of anything
related to atomism or indivisibles.
That this occurred in the first few years of Fermat’s creative mathe-
matical activity may well have influenced his presentation of the method
of maxima and minima and the method of tangents, particularly in view
of sinister tensions with transubstantiation; see Section 5.2. Such issue
may have also influenced the presentation of James Gregory’s and degli
Angeli’s work, as we argue in Sections 4.6 and 4.7.
4.5. Scheiner vs Galileo. The trial of Galileo was provoked most
likely by a denunciation from jesuit C. Scheiner (see [Festa 1991]) who
could not conceal his glee at the verdict [Festa 1991, p. 109]. Assuming
Scheiner was the source of the denunciation, Festa argues against Re-
dondi’s thesis that the atomism/eucharist issue was the hidden agenda
of the Galileo trial. Festa offers two objections among others:
(1) given that the G3 denunciation (see Section 4.8) dates from
around 1624, the Inquisition would not have delayed issuing a
summons until as late as 1632 if the real issue were G3 and
atomism/eucharist; and
(2) if on the other hand the denunciation originated with Scheiner,
the hidden agenda hypothesis becomes implausible in view of
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Scheiner’s apparent admiration for Gassendi and his book based
on atomist theses.
Both of these objections, however, are answered in Redondi’s book
itself. As far objection (1) is concerned, the proceedings against Galileo
were not initiated earlier because the pope was opposed to the idea,
and the jesuits were too weak to impose them until the dramatic turn
of historical events in 1632 (see Section 4.4). As far as objection (2) is
concerned, even if Scheiner personally were not bothered by atomism,
many others in Rome were (including the author of the EE291; see
below), and the atomism/eucharist issue would have been a natural
one to include in the indictment.
As far as the present article is concerned, what is relevant is that all
agree that
les prises de position des je´suites contre l’atomisme au
XVIIe sie`cle n’avaient pas attire´ jusqu’ici l’attention de
beaucoup d’historiens. C’est avec la de´couverte du ‘G3’
et la parution du livre de Redondi qu’un inte´reˆt pour ce
proble`me s’est manifeste´ [Festa 1991, p. 116].
The subsequent discovery of the EE291 denunciation makes irrelevant
Festa’s objection (1) and lends support to Redondi’s hypothesis; see
Section 4.10.
4.6. Degli Angeli in Italy. The jesuat mathematician degli Angeli
defended the method of indivisibles against the criticisms of jesuit
scholars. Less cautious than Cavalieri, in his rebuttal of Tacquet’s
criticism degli Angeli wrote:
“. . . if in order to approve the method of indivisibles, the
composition of the continuum from indivisibles is nec-
essarily required, then certainly this doctrine [i.e., con-
tinuum made out of indivisibles] is only strengthened in
our eyes” (degli Angeli as translated in [Alexander 2014,
p. 169–170]; cf. [Festa 1992, p. 205]).
Both indivisibles and degli Angeli himself appear to have been con-
troversial at the time in the eyes of the jesuit order, which on several
occasions banned indivisibles from being taught in their colleges. We
already mentioned in Section 3.2 that in 1632 (the year Galileo re-
ceived summons to stand trial over heliocentrism) the Society’s Revi-
sors General led by Jakob Bidermann banned teaching indivisibles in
their colleges [Festa 1990], [Festa 1992, p. 198, 207]. In 1651 indivisi-
bles were placed on the Society’s list of permanently banned doctrines
[Hellyer 1996].
36 J. BAIR, M. KATZ, AND D. SHERRY
4.7. Gregory’s departure from Italy. It seems that James Gre-
gory’s 1668 departure from Padua was well timed. Indeed, his teacher
degli Angeli’s jesuat order (to which Cavalieri had also belonged) was
not treated with clemency but on the contrary suppressed by papal
brief of Clement 9 in the same year. Alexander describes the suppres-
sion as “stunningly violent” [Alexander 2014, p. 171]. The suppression
cut short degli Angeli’s output on indivisibles. Gregory’s own books
were suppressed at Venice, according to a letter from John Collins to
Gregory dated 25 november 1669, in which he writes:
One Mr. Norris a Master’s Mate recently come from
Venice, saith it was there reported that your bookes were
suppressed, not a booke of them to be had anywhere,
but from Dr. Caddenhead to whom application being
made for one of them, he presently sent him one (though
a stranger) refusing any thing for it. [Turnbull, 1939,
p. 74]
In a 1670 letter to Collins, Gregory writes:
I shall be very willing ye writ to Dr Caddenhead in
Padua, for some of my books. In the mean time, I desire
you to present my service to him, and to inquire of him if
my books be suppressed, and the reason thereof. (Gre-
gory to Collins, St Andrews, march 7, 1670, in Turnbull
p. 88)
This passage indicates that Gregory sought an explanation for the sup-
pression of his books. We are not aware of any clarification he may
have received on this issue. In a letter to Gregory, written in London
on 29 september 1670, Collins wrote:
Father Bertet34 sayth your Bookes are in great esteeme,
but not to be procured in Italy. (Turnbull p. 107)
The publishers’ apparent reluctance to get involved with Gregory’s
books may also explain degli Angeli’s silence on indivisibles following
the suppression of his order, but it is hard to say anything definite in the
matter until the archives at the Vatican dealing with the suppression
of the jesuat order are opened to independent researchers. Certainly
one can understand Gregory’s own caution in the matter of exploiting
the infinitely small. Nonetheless, Gregory exploited some identifiably
infinitary procedures in his work; see [Bascelli et al. 2018].
34Jean Bertet (1622-1692), jesuit, quit the Order in 1681. In 1689 Bertet con-
spired with Leibniz and Antonio Baldigiani in Rome to have the ban on Coperni-
canism lifted. [Wallis 2012]
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Beyond the borders of a catholic Italy, John Wallis introduced the
symbol ∞ for an infinite number in his book Arithmetica Infinitorum
[Wallis 1656], and exploited an infinitesimal number of the form 1
∞
in
area calculations [Scott 1981, p. 18], over a decade before the publica-
tion of Gregory’s Vera Circuli. At about the same time, Barrow “dared
to explore the logical underpinnings of infinitesimals:”
Barrow, who dared to explore the logical underpinnings
of infinitesimals, was certainly modern and innovative
when he publicly defended the new mathematical meth-
ods against Tacquet and other mathematical “classi-
cists” reluctant to abandon the Aristotelian continuum.
And after all, to use historical hindsight, it was the non-
Archimedean structure of the continuum linked to the
notion of infinitesimal and advocated by Barrow that
was to prove immensely fruitful as the basis for the Leib-
nizian differential calculus. [Malet 1989, p. 244].
On the other side of the Channel, Wallis and Barrow were freer than
degli Angeli and Fermat to pursue the infinitely small.
The international nature of the jesuit organisation could not but
affect what can or cannot be said in catholic France. Fermat’s friend
Lalouve`re at Toulouse was both a jesuit and a mathematician opposed
to indivisibles. Lalouve`re actively interacted with Fermat in matters
mathematical and would surely serve as a reminder should Fermat
think of engaging in activities (such as any explicit endorsement of
Cavalieri’s doctrines) the jesuits considered objectionable.
4.8. Council of Trent, Galileo, and G3. An anonymous denunci-
ation of Galileo, labeled G3, dating from the 1620s and preserved in
the Vatican archives specifically connects Galileo’s atomism to an “er-
ror condemned by” the Council of Trent Session 13, canon 2. The G3
document stated:
. . . one will also have to say according to this doctrine
that there are the very tiny particles with which the
substance of the bread first moved our senses, which
if they were substantial (as Anaxagoras said, and this
author [i.e., Galileo] seems to allow on page 200, line 28),
it follows that in the Sacrament there are substantial
parts of bread or wine, which is the error condemned
by the Sacred Tridentine Council, Session 13, Canon 2.
(G3 cited in [Redondi 1987, p. 334])
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Having earlier mentioned the atomic theories of Anaxagoras and Dem-
ocritus (ancient authorities espousing atomism), the author of G3 goes
on to impute to Galileo an alignment with Democritus:
Or actually, if they were only sizes, shapes, numbers,
etc., as he [i.e., Galileo] also seems clearly to admit,
agreeing with Democritus, it follows that all these are
accidental modes, or, as others say, shapes of quantity.
(ibid.)
This passage indicates that Galileo’s science, allegedly following the
atomism of Democritus, was viewed as a threat to canon 13.2 related
to one of the disagreements between Rome and the protestants (see
Section 4.10), and was therefore controversial.
Galileo held that sensible qualities (color, taste, etc.) existed in
minds, but not in bodies; they were, in Galileo’s phrase, “nothing but
names so far as the object in which we place them is concerned,” with
no necessary connection to properties in bodies. Meanwhile catholic
doctrine held that a miracle was necessary to preserve the color, taste,
etc. of the host after it had been miraculously changed to the body
of the nazarene. Grassi pointed out the incompatibility of the two
doctrines.
4.9. Document EE291 on Galileo’s atomism. In 1999 Mariano
Artigas discovered an additional anonymous denunciation of Galileo.
The new document is labeled EE291 and dates from 1632. The issue
is again incompatibility with the eucharist. The author of EE291 is
thought to be the jesuit Melchior Inchofer. The criticisms voiced in
G3 were echoed in Inchofer’s 1632 denunciation EE291 in the following
terms:
2. [Galileo] errs when he says that it is not possible to
conceptually separate corporeal substances from the ac-
cidental properties that modify them, such as quantity
and those that follow quantity. Such an opinion is ab-
solutely contrary to faith, for instance in the case of the
eucharist, where quantity is not only really distinguished
from substance but, moreover, exists separately.
3. He errs when he says that taste, smell, and colour
are pure names, etc.
(as cited in [Artigas et al. 2005])
The denunciation was filed in 1632 only a few months before Galileo
received summons to stand trial.
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4.10. Concerning Canon 13.2. In 1551 the said canon stipulated:
CANON II. If any one saith, that, in the sacred and
holy sacrament of the eucharist, the substance of the
bread and wine remains conjointly35 with the body and
blood of [the nazarene], and denieth that wonderful and
singular conversion of the whole substance of the bread
into the Body, and of the whole substance of the wine
into the Blood–the species Only of the bread and wine
remaining–which conversion indeed the Catholic Church
most aptly calls Transubstantiation; let him be anath-
ema. (Council of Trent, Session 13) (emphasis added)
The Council of Trent said nothing of mathematical indivisibles, but
the jesuits interpreted 13.2 as anathemizing both physical and mathe-
matical indivisibles, a distinction they may not have drawn. Whether
they did or not is irrelevant for our purposes.
It is less than apparent why this canon entails the condemnation of
indivisibles, so a word of explanation is in order. The key to under-
standing the conflict between Galilean atoms and 13.2 is the adverb
conjointly (“una cum” in the original), which alludes to the doctrine of
consubstantiation, one of the alternatives to transubstantiation. Ac-
cording to consubstantiation, the doctrine condemned by Aquinas as
heresy but favored by Luther, the substance of the bread and the sub-
stance of the nazarene’s body are present together in the eucharist.
In transubstantiation, by contrast, the substance of the bread is
changed by a miracle into the substance of the nazarene’s body; see
[McCue 1968] for details. Now, Galileo’s atomism holds that the sen-
sible qualities of the bread are no more than the effect of the atoms
of the bread acting upon the sense organs; i.e., they are not qualities
of the bread itself. Since it is inconceivable that the faithful should
be deceived through sensations that correspond to nothing real in the
eucharist, the atomist must insist that the atoms of bread continue to
exist consubstantially, i.e. together with the body of the nazarene, to
cause those sensations; see [Chareix 2002] for details.
35“panis et vini una cum corpore et sanguine” in the original Latin. This is the
key term here - this is the doctrine favored by Luther - consubstantiation. It was
favored also by Scotus and Ockham, who rejected it only because it was inconsistent
with the 1215 Lateran council. Artigas et al. note that “the concept of substance
[in 13.2] was borrowed from Aristotelian philosophy” [Artigas et al. 2005]. The sub-
stance/form dichotomy is the content of the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism.
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Galileo’s critic, Grassi, scoffed that for the preservation of mere
names no miracle would be required.36 A condemnation of atomism
as subversive of the eucharist was issued by jesuit Sforza Pallavicino
[Festa 1991, p. 115]; [Festa 1992, p. 203]. A further denunciation was
issued in 1632; see Section 4.9.
4.11. Old and new heresy. Incompatibility with canonical doctrine
was not merely a theoretical issue. Thus, David Derodon’s book was
burned as the result of a denunciation and pressure exerted by the je-
suits [Redondi 1987, p. 274]. Derodon’s 1655 book, Dispute sur l’Eucha-
ristie, affirmed the spiritual presence over the real presence of the
nazarene (ibid.). Redondi refers to it as the old heresy ; this was first
codified in 1079 by the synod of Rome.
Another illustration of the inherent dangers of publication may have
been familiar to Fermat through his friendship with the d’Espagnets.
Jean d’Espagnet collected scientific manuscripts and eventually passed
on his library to his son Etienne. Jean wrote a book on alchemy under a
pseudonym because in the atmosphere of the counterreformation it may
have been dangerous to publish it under his own name [Willard 1999,
p. xxii]. Fermat first became acquainted with the work of Vieta through
this private library in Bordeaux in the late 1620s. Many of Fermat’s
manuscripts were deposited with Etienne d’Espagnet for safekeeping
and eventually reached Mersenne.
Fermat may well have come to the conclusion that publishing books
was too risky, and chose a safer method of disseminating his discoveries
through private letters and manuscripts. The fate of alchemists impru-
dent enough to publish under their real names in the 1620s is analyzed
in [Kahn 2002].
Atomism and indivisibles were seen by some in the catholic hierarchy,
including Grassi, the author of G3, Inchofer, and others, as a threat to
the said canon 13.2.
4.12. Reception of Galileo trial in France. Lewis’s monograph
[Lewis 2006] analyzes the reception of the Galileo trial in France, while
the monograph [Palmerino–Thijssen 2004] presents a broader Euro-
pean perspective. The salient points for us concern Fermat’s correspon-
dents in Paris, Carcavy and Mersenne. Marin Mersenne contributed in
a major way to the diffusion of Galileo’s ideas in France [Lewis 2006,
36Grassi’s objections (see [Festa 1991, pp. 100–101]) closely parallel those con-
tained in G3, leading Redondi to conjecture that Grassi was in fact the author of G3.
Many Galileo scholars, however, feel that there is insufficient evidence for this, and
specifically reject Redondi’s claim of similarity of handwriting. See Section 4.5 for
further details.
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Chapter 5]; see also [Palmerino–Thijssen 2004, p. 36]. Carcavy sought
to help Galileo disseminate his works [Lewis 2006, Chapter 4]; see also
[Palmerino–Thijssen 2004, p. 38].
Fermat’s letter to Mersenne indicates that Fermat possessed a copy
of Galileo’s Due Nuove Scienze as early as 10 august 1638 [Lewis 2006,
p. 137]. Fermat was involved in discussions of Galileo’s science of mo-
tion, as we know from a letter from Pardies to Oldenburg:
“Father La Loube`re came in on this and demonstrated
that motion could perfectly well occur in the hypothesis
of Father Cazre´ provided that the body did not pass
through all degrees of slowness. In fact he claims that as
the weight of a body is determined at a certain degree of
force, this weight also pushes the body downwards with
a certain degree of speed from the beginning of its fall;
and this seemed so reasonable that Mr. Fermat himself
found no fault with it.” (quoted in [Palmerino 2003,
p. 217])
Here Father La Loube`re is none other than Fermat’s friend Lalouve`re,
enemy of indivisibles [Descotes 2015, p. 267], who appears to have dis-
cussed a variety of scientific subjects with Fermat.
Yet another Galileo–Fermat connection is analyzed in [Roberts 2011].
5. Fermat at Castres and conclusion
Fermat was personally in charge of interdenominational issues as
part of his professional responsibilities at the Parliament of Toulouse:
[Fermat] fait partie de la “Chambre de l’E´dit”, pre´vue
par l’e´dit de Nantes pour juger paritairement des lit-
iges entre catholiques et protestants. Il fut un homme
de compre´hension et de conciliation, au lendemain des
guerres de religion. [Fe´ron 2002]
Fermat acted as a representative of the Parliament of Toulouse to the
Chambre de l’E´dit in Castres in charge of conflicts involving Protestants
and Catholics.
Fermat’s official position as mediator may help explain his reticence
to comment on issues, like the nature of his E exploited in the method
of adequality, that could have involved him in controversy over the
canons; see Section 4.8.
5.1. Jean de l’Hospital, (ancient) Conseiller . Jean de l’Hospital
was Conseiller at the Parliament of Toulouse until 1562, when he was
expelled “en raison de ses choix religieux” [Mouranche 2017, pp. 27–28].
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Following the 1572 Bartholomew massacre [Mouranche 2017, p. 42], he
became president of a judicial body (chambre mi-partie) that would
move to Castres and eventually be transformed into the Chambre de
l’E´dit. According to historians who identify Claire de Long as Pierre
de Fermat’s mother,37 Jean de l’Hospital was his great-grandfather; see
further in Section 5.4.
5.2. Fermat’s poem. Fermat kept a safe distance away from the sub-
ject of con/transubstantiation (see Section 4.10) not only in his math-
ematics but also in his poetry. Fermat’s poem was presented at the
Academy of Castres (of which Fermat was not officially a member) in
1656 [Mouranche 2017, p. 60].
Fermat was inspired by Balzac’s lucid writings on some arcane points
of religious doctrine to attempt to do the same with regard to the events
surrounding the execution of the nazarene. The resulting poem was
meant to enlighten and inspire the faithful with regard to this central
event of both catholic and protestant traditions. It would therefore
have been natural to mention the eucharist as well in the poem. The
fact that Fermat does not do so directly is significant.
Fermat’s 101-line hexameter poem concerning the events leading up
to the execution carefully steers away from the subject of the eucharist,
which is however considered by Fermat’s coreligionists to be central to
the events in question. The execution is evoked at line 36, followed at
lines 55–56 by a flashback to his companions falling asleep (after the
supper when he reportedly uttered the words hoc est corpus, etc.), but
there is no mention in the poem of hoc est corpus.
The related interdenominational tensions are well illustrated by the
following passage penned by anglican archbishop John Tillotson in
1694: “In all probability those common juggling words of hocus pocus
are nothing else but a corruption of hoc est corpus, by way of ridiculous
imitation of the [catholic] priests . . . in their trick of Transubstantia-
tion.”38
5.3. Academy of Castres. Further details on the Academy of Cas-
tres are provided by Spiesser:
. . . c’est surtout a` Castres que se retrouvent nombre de
correspondants et d’interlocuteurs de Fermat. Peut-eˆtre
est-ce une des raisons pour lesquelles le magistrat affec-
tionnait tout particulie`rement d’y se´journer. Ce bas-
tion de la religion re´forme´e en albigeois, au de´but du
37See note 26.
38See also http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=hocus-pocus
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XVIIe sie`cle, accueille le Chambre de l’Edit entre 1632
et 1670; et ce sont les membres de cette Chambre, parmi
lesquelles se trouvent beaucoup de huguenots, qui ont
constitue´ les forces vives de l’Acade´mie fonde´e en 1648
par Paul Pellisson, et dont les anne´es florissantes se
situent dans cette pe´riode. [Spiesser 2016, p. 292]
Spiesser continues with a more detailed description of Fermat’s circle
of acquaintances at Castres:
Le re´seau castrais de Pierre de Fermat s’organise autour
de l’Acade´mie locale. Bien qu’a` notre connaissance, il
n’ait jamais e´te´ membre de cette institution, elle con-
stitue la pierre de touche de ses alliances amicales et
litte´raires. L’avocat Pierre Saporta, membre de cette
petite acade´mie et traducteur du ‘Traite´ sur la mesure
des eaux courantes’ du pe`re be´ne´dictain Benedetto Castelli,
ainsi que d’un ouvrage de Torricelli sur le ‘mouvement
des eaux’, admire Fermat. (ibid.)
Given that Fermat’s main professional occupation as Conseiller at
the Parliament of Toulouse and its Chambre de l’e´dit at Castres in-
volved delicate matters of interdenominational dialogue, Fermat could
hardly have allowed himself to get involved in anything related to is-
sues of controversy dividing the different and sometimes warring (see
Section 4.4) communities, such as the issues of transubstantiation and
its potential tensions with atomism (and, by implication, with indivis-
ibles and the infinitely small), seen at the time as potentially contrary
to canon established at the Council of Trent in the previous century,
with dire consequences for failing to toe the canonical line.
5.4. The lesson of the Marranos of Toulouse. A case in point (of
failing to toe the canonical line) is the tale of 18 Toulouse Marranos,
judged by the honorable judge de Fermat fils among others and sen-
tenced in 1685. The Marranos escaped in time and only their effigies
were burned in absentia in 1692: “Les accuse´s ont eu raison de s’enfuir.
Toulouse les aurait certainement envoye´s au buˆcher.”39 [Blamont 2000,
p. 352].
When Pierre Fermat was a teenager, Lucilio Vanini (1585–1619) was
executed at Toulouse on charges of blasphemy [Mouranche 2017, p. 62].
39“The accused were right to flee. Toulouse would have certainly sent them to
the stake.” One of the 18 Marranos, named Roque de Leon, was an ancestor of
Jacques Blamont; see [Blamont 2000, p. 17].
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No Conseiller other than Pierre de Fermat of the Parliament of
Toulouse was interested in mathematics and no member in the protes-
tant academy of Castres was a mathematician, but a rumor of dubious
dealings in consubstantial natural philosophy may well have ruined
Fermat, who had his share of enemies at the Parliament, including the
President Fieubet.40 To put in bluntly, the honorable judge Pierre de
Fermat risked ending up on the wrong side of the bench (or suffering
the fate of his great-grandfather; see Section 5.1) had he pursued those
exceedingly little devils with excessive zeal.
The infinitely small were seen as inseparable from atomism, which
was seen as heretical because it contradicted canon 13.2 of the Council
of Trent, which was one of the major issues dividing catholics and
protestants, so much so that books and people were burned over this.
In a more liberal milieu, mathematicians like Wallis, Barrow, and
Huygens felt freer to speak of, and indeed freely spoke of, the infinitely
small, resuming the discussion where the once-flourishing Italian school
had left it.
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